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Abstract: 
Zell and Alicke (2009) have shown that comparisons with a few people have a stronger influence 
on self‐evaluations than comparisons with larger samples. One explanation for this effect is that 
people readily categorize their standing in small groups as “good” or “bad,” which supersedes 
large‐sample data. To test this explanation, we created a situation in which students learned that 
their performance ranked 5th or 6th out of 10 persons on a task. In each experimental session, 
two groups, each containing 5 people, were created by random assignment. Some students 
learned that their performance placed them last in one group of 5, and some learned that they 
were first in the other group of 5. In the other conditions, participants learned only that that they 
were 5th or 6th in the group of 10. Results showed that being last in the superior group led to 
lower self‐evaluations than being first in the inferior group.  
 
Article: 
Self‐knowledge is a dear and precarious commodity: difficult to obtain and sometimes painful 
when acquired. In a perfect informational world, people would have reliable and valid data from 
large samples on which to calibrate the extremity and worth of their habits, thoughts, 
preferences, skills, and desires. In the real world, self‐knowledge is haphazard: One friend 
praises the poem that I wrote, but another lampoons it. One day I trounce my golf partners, and 
the next requires an expedition to find my golf ball in the woods. In this welter of confusing, 
contradictory, and incomplete feedback, it is no wonder that self‐knowledge is often tenuous, 
inaccurate, and overly optimistic (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).  
 
One fundamental source of bias in self‐knowledge and self‐evaluation derives from social 
comparison opportunities for analyzing personal characteristics. Festinger’s (1954) social 
comparison theory was the first to highlight the importance of comparisons with other people for 
self‐knowledge. Festinger emphasized the conditions that would make such comparisons useful 
and the types of comparisons that would be most informative. Whereas Festinger’s theory 
depicted a deliberate process of choosing comparisons and weighing their consequences, the 
subsequent history of social comparison research argues for a more spontaneous process 
(Blanton & Stapel, 2008). In short, comparisons are typically encountered rather than sought: 
They are less something we hanker after than something we cannot avoid.  
 
The ubiquity and spontaneity of comparisons suggest that people will tend to assess their actions 
and outcomes with reference to whatever targets are available, regardless of their diagnosticity 
(Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). In fact, local comparison information involving a relatively 
small group of available targets supersedes the effect of much larger and more valid sample data 
(Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Zell & Alicke, 2009). One facet of this local comparison effect 
that educational and developmental psychologists have studied involves comparisons that arise 
in schools and their influence on students’ self‐concepts (Davis, 1966). The most prominent 
investigations in this line of research have been conducted on the big‐fish‐in‐a‐little‐pond, or 
frog‐pond, effect (Huguet et al., 2009; Marsh & Parker, 1984; Marsh et al., 2008, in press; 
Seaton, Marsh, & Craven, 2009).  
 
The frog‐pond effect is the finding that high‐performing students at academically inferior schools 
evaluated themselves more favorably than low‐performing students at superior schools, after 
researchers statistically controlled for ability level. The frog‐pond effect has been demonstrated 
in elementary, middle, and high school settings across more than 40 diverse countries (Seaton, 
Marsh, & Craven, 2009). Recently, we have conducted studies to expand the frog‐pond effect 
into a general conception of local versus general comparisons (Zell & Alicke, 2009). We have 
shown, for example, that being the best or worst performer in a small group of 5 people 
influences self‐evaluations more than information about one’s standing in a population of over 
1,500 individuals. In fact, when local comparison information is available, it generally negates 
the effect of larger population data (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002). We believe, therefore, that the 
frog‐pond effect is an important manifestation of the tendency for highly available local 
information to supersede more general comparison information, which we call the local 
dominance effect.  
 
The local dominance effect has been widely demonstrated (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002; Zell & 
Alicke, 2009) but sparsely explained. On the basis of past research, an obvious guess about local 
dominance would be that people are relatively insensitive to large numbers and abstract base 
rates (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). However, we have shown that 
large‐sample data are very influential when local comparison information is absent; it is the 
dominance of local over general comparison information that remains to be explained.  
 
One explanation that we pursue in this work is that local comparisons entail perceptions of group 
membership and that people habitually evaluate themselves with reference to their group 
standing. This, of course, is the essential assumption of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986), which we extend to the contrast between local and general comparisons. Local 
comparisons, especially with family members and small groups of peers, are the primary source 
of self‐knowledge throughout early development. Children learn to categorize themselves in 
various ways: as the shyest member of their family, the fastest runner among their friends, a 
middling math student in their class, and so on. Although standardized tests and media depictions 
provide some experience with larger aggregates, the pervasive tendency to categorize oneself in 
relation to a few salient others remains the most influential mode of self‐evaluation.  
 
One way to demonstrate the importance of categorization in self‐evaluation is to counterpose 
conditions in which an individual’s performance outcome varies only by whether it is defined in 
terms of its standing in a minimal group or a larger group. Consider the case of a student who 
learns that she is the fifth or sixth best performer among the 10 people who have completed a 
task, thus placing her in the middle of the pack. Now consider the same scores but this time 
defined in reference to separate groups of 5 students: In Group A, the student’s fifth‐ranking 
score places her at the bottom of the pack, whereas in Group B, her sixth‐ranking score places 
her at the top (i.e., everyone in Group A performs better than everyone in Group B). This is an 
extreme experimental analogue of the frog‐pond situation, in which a student is either the lowest 
scorer in a superior group or the highest scorer in an inferior one, although the experimental 
situation has the advantage that the student knows exactly where she stands among all 
participants.  
 
If local group categorizations matter, then the student who is the best member of the bad group 
should evaluate her or his performance more favorably than the student who is the worst member 
of the good group, despite having objectively worse performance (6th of 10 vs. 5th of 10). 
Another compelling finding would be to show that the student who places 5th in the good group 
evaluates himself or herself more negatively than the student who learns only that she is 5th 
overall, whereas the student who places 1st in the bad group evaluates herself more favorably 
than the student who learns only that she is 6th overall.  
 
METHOD 
Participants and design 
One hundred students (67 female and 33 male) at a large Midwestern university participated in 
exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology class. Each experimental session 
contained 10 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four feedback 
conditions (fifth, sixth, worst and fifth, or best and sixth), which yielded a 2 (rank: fifth or sixth) 
× 2 (grouped or ungrouped) between‐subjects design.  
 
Materials and procedure 
Students were told that the research they were participating in focused on the effects of group 
membership on performance. The experimenter stated that some studies have found that people 
perform better in groups than alone, whereas others had found that people perform worse in 
groups than when alone. The purpose of the present study was ostensibly to help resolve these 
contradictory findings.  
 
The 10 students were categorized into one of two 5‐person groups (Group A or Group B) 
according to the letter they drew out of a hat. To ensure that there was no contact among group 
members, students were told that it was essential that they did not talk to any of the other 
participants, although they were encouraged to speak to the experimenters if they had any 
questions. After sorting the students into groups, we brought each group separately into a 
computer laboratory. Students in Group A were seated in a column on the right side of the room, 
and students in Group B were seated in a column on the left side of the room.  
 
Participants then completed a lie detection test. The test required students to watch peers making 
videotaped statements and then to indicate, for each statement, whether they thought the peers 
were telling the truth or lying (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002). The video clips were displayed on 
a large projector screen, and participants indicated their responses privately at their computers 
using the MediaLab computer program (Jarvis, 2004).  
 
After watching and responding to 15 video clips, students were provided with bogus feedback 
about their performance. All participants were told that they had correctly identified 9 of 15 
statements as a truth or a lie and that this performance ranked 5th or 6th of the 10 people in the 
room. Then some participants were given additional information indicating that they ranked best 
or worst in their 5‐person group.  
 
After reviewing their feedback, students evaluated their performance (“How well do you think 
you performed on the lie detection test?”) and lie detection ability (“How would you rate your lie 
detection ability?”) on 7‐point scales, ranging from 1, very poorly/bad, to 7, very well/good. 
Scores were aggregated to create an index of self‐evaluation (r = .52). Finally, as a feedback 
manipulation check, participants were asked to recall how well they performed relative to the 9 
other students currently taking part in the experiment as well as how well they performed relative 
to the 4 other people in their small group (assuming they received this information).  
 
RESULTS 
We removed the data of 4 participants because they failed one or more of the feedback 
manipulation checks. There were no gender effects in any of the analyses for this study; thus, 
gender is not discussed further.  
 
A 2 × 2 analysis of variance was conducted on self‐evaluation ratings, and only a Rank (fifth or 
sixth) × Group (grouped or ungrouped) two‐way interaction was obtained, F(1, 92) = 7.33, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .07 (see Fig. 1). Simple‐effects tests showed that students who were told only that they 
ranked 5th in the room (M = 5.33) did not evaluate themselves significantly more favorably than 
students who were told only that they ranked 6th (M = 5.00, p > .15).1 However, in keeping with 
the main prediction, students evaluated themselves significantly more favorably when they 
ranked 6th out of 10 but best in their 5‐person group (M = 5.70) as opposed to 5th out of 10 but 
worst in their 5‐person group (M = 4.78), t(92) = 2.81, p < .005, d = 0.90.  
 
 
Figure 1: Participants’ mean self‐evaluations (rated on a scale ranging from 1, very poorly/bad, to 7, very well/good) as a function of test 
feedback. Participants were told that their rank among 10 persons was 5th, 6th, 5th and worst in their 5‐person group, or 6th and best in their 5‐
person group. Error bars represent ±1 SE.  
 
Simple‐effects tests were also conducted to examine whether ranking in the group of 5 altered 
self‐evaluations relative to knowledge of overall ranking among the 10 participants. As expected, 
students evaluated themselves significantly more favorably when they learned that they ranked 
6th out of 10 but best in their 5‐person group as opposed to simply learning that they ranked 6th 
out of 10, t(92) = 2.17, p < .02, d = 0.67. Additionally, students evaluated themselves 
significantly less favorably when they ranked 5th out of 10 but worst in their 5‐person group as 
opposed to just 5th out of 10, t(92) = 1.67, p < .05, d = 0.45.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study suggest strongly that social categorization contributes to the well‐
known frog‐pond effect, as well as to local dominance more generally. Simply dividing 
participants into groups arbitrarily produced a tendency to favor local information for self‐
evaluation over a larger data source. These findings suggest that the frog‐pond and local 
dominance effects are pervasive phenomena that occur whenever local comparison data are 
available with which to categorize one’s standing in a group, even when group membership is 
minimal.  
 
The present findings also provide further validation for frog‐pond findings that have been 
obtained in real educational settings. Although research on the frog‐pond effect statistically 
equates good members of bad groups and bad members of good groups (Marsh & Parker, 1984; 
Marsh et al., 2008), there is always the possibility in nonexperimental designs that the findings 
may reflect accurate self‐evaluations, that is, that the good students in mediocre schools are in 
some way superior to the poorer students in superior schools. Excellent students attend mediocre 
schools for various reasons, whereas superior schools almost inevitably contain some 
unmotivated students. Our experimental design demonstrated frog‐pond type effects in a context 
in which their accuracy or inaccuracy could be objectively assessed. In other words, although 
ranking 5th among 10 people is objectively better than ranking 6th, categorization into groups 
produced a situation in which being ranked 6th led to more favorable self‐evaluations than being 
ranked 5th. Those who ranked 5th contrasted their ability from the group standard, a finding 
consistent with those of Huguet et al. (2009); that is, contrast typically occurs when comparisons 
are forced or encountered (as they were in our study) as opposed to selected by the participant.  
 
A logical outgrowth of the present research is to see how far these findings can be extended. 
Would seventh‐ranked members evaluate themselves more favorably than fourth‐ranked 
members based on group categorization? Eighth better than third? At some point, reality 
constraints will operate to negate the local dominance effect, but further research is needed to 
establish the extent to which local group categorization overrides more diagnostic data from a 
larger information source.  
 
NOTES 
1. Because we had clear directional predictions, and strong theoretical justification for these 
predictions, all reported t tests are one‐tailed.  
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